Speed Brief: The Attorney General’s Power to order Fresh Investigations

In order to quash a finding and order a fresh investigation under Section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988, it is necessary to obtain a “Fiat” (approval) from the Attorney General to make an application to the High Court. The following two cases, whilst heard in the same month, resulted in different outcomes – one being approved, and the other rejected by the Attorney General.

Case 1: Campbell – can the decision of the Attorney General to refuse permission under Section 13 be challenged? 

In the first of these cases (R (Campbell) v HM Attorney General of England and Wales [2025] EWHC 1653 (Admin)), the Court considered a preliminary issue arising in judicial review proceedings: the justiciability of a decision of the Attorney General (“AG”) to refuse a fiat for an application to the High Court.

The facts

Geoffrey Campbell was unlawfully killed in the World Trade Centre attacks in New York City on 11 September 2001. The Inquest, held on 29 January 2013, concluded that the building collapsed due to an aircraft deliberately flying into the building. Geoffrey’s brother, the Claimant, relied on fresh evidence to suggest the collapse was not caused by the aircraft but from pre-planted explosives. The Claimant applied to the AG for authority to apply to the High Court for an order quashing the finding and ordering a new investigation, supported by a large volume of documentary evidence. The application was refused twice by the AG in 2021 and 2024, on the basis that the cause of the collapse had been investigated already in the United States; there was a clear, consensus view about what happened; and the Claimant’s hypothesis “fanciful”. The AG relied upon the principle that a Law Officer’s discretion in respect of functions relating to the public interest is absolute and not reviewable. The Claimant sought to challenge this principle, and the decisions of the AG, via judicial review.

The case for challenge

There were five grounds advanced in the judicial review application, namely that: 

I. the AG erred in law as to the test to be applied to the question of whether a new investigation was in the interests of justice; 

II. the decision was irrational in light of the fresh evidence; 

III. the AG failed to give adequate reasons; 

IV. the finding of a “clear consensus view” about what happened on 11 September 2001 was unreasonable; and that

V. it was unreasonable to categorise the Claimant’s hypothesis as “fanciful”. 

The preliminary hearing considered the key case law on reviewability of decisions of the Attorney General at length. The AG relied on the case of Gouriet  as an “authority for the proposition that decisions in the exercise of the Attorney General’s public functions are not justiciable” (para 40), whilst the Claimant argued that the comments of the Court in that case were “obiter” and not related to the question of reviewability of the AG’s decision. 

The High Court upheld the Gouriet principle and the AG’s submissions, holding that: “the category of functions whose exercise is non-justiciable includes… powers to authorise or terminate such proceedings by others—i.e. powers which make the Attorney General a gatekeeper to the court and therefore (as some of the older authorities suggest) part of the administration of justice” (para 55). Insofar as applications under Section 13(1) are concerned, the Court also confirmed that the power of the AG under that provision was “conferred specifically and only on the Attorney General”  and that it represented a “gatekeeping function”. 

Mr Justice Chamberlain held that this was a necessary part of the power under Section 13(1), because “the public interest might be damaged if the proceedings in question could be brought by private individuals without any filter”. (para 56).

The decision of the High Court in Campbell has therefore reinforced the view that the decisions of the AG to grant a fiat under Section 13 are an important part of the AG’s gatekeeping function, and are therefore considered final, and not open to challenge via judicial review. 

Case 2: Pronesti - Delay and the discovery of new facts 

In the second case of Pronesti (His Majesty’s Senior Coroner for West Yorkshire (Western District)  [2025] EWHC 1672 (Admin)), the Senior Coroner for West Yorkshire brought a claim under Section 13(1)(b) of the Coroners Act 1988, with the approval from the AG, for the determination and findings of the inquest into the death of Leonardo Pronesti to be quashed and a fresh investigation conducted. The application was made on the basis of evidence coming to light after the inquest, which had not been taken account during the initial investigation into the death, but it also considered the impact of the considerable delay  in receiving from the fiat from the Attorney General. 

The facts

Leonardo Pronesti died on 25 December 2017. He had a history of mental health difficulties and self-harm with suicidal ideation and had been under the care of mental health services. On 21 December 2017, a package was left at a mental health unit in Dewsbury, which contained Leonardo’s name and “evidence of suicidal ideation/preparation, although no suicide note”. A nurse was unable to contact Leonardo, and so they notified the police. On the same day, he was admitted to hospital with a suspected overdose. The next day he denied suicidal intent and was discharged, and referred back to the community mental health team. Leonardo’s mother contacted the police on 25 December 2017, as she was concerned he had not joined her for Christmas day. The police attended Leonardo’s home, where he was found deceased, with evidence of his death by suicide. 

An inquest was opened and evidence gathered. Although the package which was sent to the Mental Health Unit on 21 December 2017 was delivered to the Coroner’s Officer, the officer resided at a different address to the Coroners themselves, and the package was not provided to the Assistant Coroner who heard the Inquest, and who held upon conclusion of the inquest in December 2018 that “there was insufficient evidence to indicate that [Leonardo] intended to take his own life”. 

The contents of the package were later discovered at the office of the Coroner’s officers and were provided to the Assistant Coroner in February 2019. The contents included many references to suicidal ideation, leading the Assistant Coroner to conclude that the documents were relevant to his findings and had he received them in 2018, he probably would have recorded a conclusion of suicide. Following a meeting with the family, the Senior Coroner applied to the AG for approval to bring an application under Section 13 on 27 February 2020 for a fresh inquest, but the approval was not granted until 15 May 2024 – over four years after the application, and nearly seven years after Leonardo’s death.

The application 

The basis of the Senior Coroner’s claim was straightforward, relying on the second limb under Section 13(1) – i.e. 

“(b) where an inquest or an investigation has been held by him, that (whether by reason of fraud, rejection of evidence, irregularity of proceedings, insufficiency of inquiry, the discovery of new facts or evidence or otherwise) it is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice that an investigation (or as the case may be, another investigation) should be held.”

The High Court agreed that the contents of the package of documents were relevant to the scope of the inquest and that the conclusion returned by the Assistant Coroner as to cause of death would probably have been different had the Coroner seen those documents. The High Court also concluded that, due to the facts surrounding Leonardo’s death and the role of the mental health unit: “if this had been the conclusion which he reached, it is arguable that section 5 of the 2009 Act would have required the Assistant Coroner to have considered whether and to what extent both the South West Yorkshire Partnership NHS Foundation Trust and the West Yorkshire Police had complied with an operational duty owed to the Deceased to protect his life under Article 2 ECHR” (para 36).

The High Court therefore considered that it was in the interests of justice that a further investigation (and inquest) should be ordered to take place. 

As to the delay in the AG issuing the fiat, the High Court recorded its concern that this had been granted for over four years. Lord Justice Baker acknowledged that “ [this] will not only have caused further unnecessary anxiety to the Deceased’s family, but may have an adverse impact on the quality of the evidence available to those responsible for conducting the fresh investigation and fresh inquest into the death of the Deceased. In these circumstances, a copy of this judgment will be sent to the Attorney-General” (Para 40).

Should you wish to discuss these insights in more detail, or how we can help with inquest management, please do contact us.