UK Legal Latest: Key cases and updates from the Eversheds Sutherland Corporate Claims team

Cases
Liability

AB & Ors v Leicestershire County Council [2026] EWHC 331 (KB) – High Court

Court refused to disapply primary limitation period in a historical sexual abuse claim

The High Court considered three historical child sexual abuse claims brought against Leicestershire County Council. The Claimants alleged they were abused in the 1980s while in the Council’s care. The alleged perpetrators were a former care home manager later convicted of numerous sexual offences, and an MP for Leicester. Both had died before proceedings began. The Claimants argued that Leicestershire County Council was vicariously liable for the alleged abuse. The Council denied the allegations, also asserting that the claims were statute-barred. The issue was whether the court should exercise its discretion under Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 (the “Act”) to disapply limitation.

The court accepted that each Claimant presented a case capable of prima facie belief. However, the delay in bringing the proceedings was described as exceptionally long, with limitation periods having expired for all Claimants between 1989 and 1992. Both alleged abusers were deceased and therefore unable to respond to the allegations. The passage of time had led to the loss or unavailability of potentially significant witnesses, and none of the Claimants had made contemporaneous complaints. The judge also identified credibility concerns affecting all three claims, including inconsistencies, criminal backgrounds, and evidence of personality disorders. The court declined to disapply the limitation period and therefore the claims could not proceed.

This decision is significant because it may be one of the last judgments decided under the existing limitation framework for historical abuse claims. The Home Office has amended clause 87 of the Crime and Policing Bill to remove the three-year limitation period for civil personal injury claims arising from child sexual abuse. The clause inserts a new section 11ZB into the Act providing that such claims must be dismissed if the Defendant satisfies the court that a fair hearing cannot take place.

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Kerry Middleton v Carnival PLC t/a P&O Cruises [2026] EWHC 235 (KB) – High Court

Permission given to Defendants to rely on surveillance evidence served late

The High Court considered whether a Defendant should be allowed to rely on surveillance evidence disclosed shortly before trial. The Claimant, a former HR director, suffered a neck fracture after slipping on a wet floor on a P&O cruise in 2019 and as a result developed Functional Neurological Disorder (“FND”). Although liability was admitted, the parties remained in dispute over causation and the extent of her ongoing disability. The Claimant claimed she had become largely wheelchair dependent and sought damages of £10.2 million whilst the Defendant valued the claim at no more than £25,000.

Three months before the January 2026 trial, the Defendant disclosed surveillance footage recorded between 2023 and 2025. The footage from December 2024 appeared to show the Claimant walking independently despite her assertion that she could not mobile without a wheelchair.

The Claimant opposed the application to rely on the footage, arguing it was an “ambush” and that it would prejudice the trial date. The court was asked to exercise its broad discretion under CPR 32.1. The judge emphasised that relevant surveillance should generally be admitted unless its deployment amounts to trial by ambush.

The Claimant had claimed that she suffered with a significant deterioration in her condition and began to suffer with seizures in December 2024. This led to the parties varying the directions and obtaining updated expert evidence. By an order of 9 May 2025, permission was granted for updated evidence in neurology, psychiatry and pain management with additional permission for expert neuropsychiatry evidence. The joint statements were not received until 2 September 2025 with more evidence to follow on 10 October 2025. The surveillance footage was subsequently disclosed on 14 October 2025.

The court held the Defendant had acted reasonably in waiting for the Claimant’s final expert evidence, before disclosing the footage in October 2025, particularly given evolving reports on the Claimant’s alleged deterioration of her condition.

The Claimant’s first reaction to the footage was to query whether the Defendant intended to rely on the evidence as it had little if any probative value and would only add costs for the experts viewing it. The Claimant made no suggestion that the timing of the disclosed surveillance footage jeopardised the trial date. It was not until the unsuccessful JSM of 4 December 2025 that the Claimant indicated her resistance to the admission of the footage.

Permission to rely on the surveillance footage was granted, even though it meant vacating the trial.

This decision shows the importance of timing when disclosing surveillance evidence. Defendants must avoid disclosing too early or too late. The case reinforces that late disclosure may still be permitted where parties have acted cooperatively and the evidence is central to assessing the true extent of injury and loss.

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CCC (by her mother and litigation friend MMM) (Appellant) v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (Respondent) [2026] UKSC 5 – Supreme Court

‘Lost years’ damages available to child Claimants

The case concerned a girl who sustained a catastrophic brain injury at birth. Liability was admitted. As a result of the injury, CC lives with profound disabilities and has a significantly reduced life expectancy of around 29 years. The parties agreed on her likely earnings up to the age 29, but a key issue remained whether she could recover compensation for the income she would have earned after age 29 had her life not been shortened, known as “lost years” damages.

As the trial judge was bound by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Croke v Wiseman (1982), which barred “lost years” awards for young children, he could not award them. The case was therefore sent directly to the Supreme Court to reconsider whether Croke should continue to apply and whether it was consistent with the earlier House of Lords decisions in Pickett v British Rail Engineering (1980) and Gammell v Wilson (1982).

The Supreme Court held that “lost years” damages are recoverable by children whose life expectancy has been reduced by negligence, and it overruled Croke v Wiseman.

The Court reaffirmed a core principle that damages in tort are compensatory. A Claimant, whether they are an adult or child, should be put back in the financial position they would have been in had the negligence not occurred. The Court rejected the reasoning in Croke that damages should be denied because a child typically has no dependants or because predicting a child’s future earnings is speculative. Uncertainty, it emphasised, is inherent in all assessments of future loss, even for adults. Difficulty in calculation is not a justification for awarding nothing.

The Court also recognised that modern statistical tools, earnings data, and background evidence often allow a sufficiently reliable estimation of a child’s likely future career. That had already been demonstrated in CCC’s own case, where both sides agreed her likely educational trajectory, employment, retirement age, and pension rights had she not been injured.

The ruling confirms that the compensatory principle applies equally to all Claimants, regardless of age. Children are no longer excluded from “lost years” claims simply because their future is less predictable. The Court did not however, prescribe a method for calculating “lost years”.

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CGT, R (On the Application Of) v West Sussex County Council [2026] EWHC 293 (Admin) – High Court

A local authority tried to count a personal injury trust as fair game and sought payback

This judicial review concerned a decision by a local authority on 7 June 2024 to cease funding the Claimant’s care needs from 6 July 2024 and to demand repayment of £271,253.44 previously paid on a discretionary without prejudice basis.

The Claimant, who has severe lifelong disabilities following a brain injury in infancy, had received over £3.5m in Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (CICA) damages. Around £2.6m of that award, identified for future care was placed in a personal injury trust (PI Trust).

In 2012, during the original CICA proceedings, the Claimant’s late mother and the Official Solicitor gave undertakings to the CICA not to seek public funding for care. After her death, the Claimant’s father became deputy in 2014 but he never gave such undertakings. From 2020 the local authority funded care but later asserted that the Claimant should meet his own care costs from the PI Trust.  When the Court of Protection refused to vary the deputyship to impose spending restrictions, the authority relied instead on the 2012 undertakings and “double recovery” arguments to justify withdrawing funding and seeking repayment.

The court held that the statutory scheme under the Care Act 2014 and the Care and Support (Charging and Assessment of Resources) Regulations 2014 is unequivocal. Paragraph 15 of Schedule 2 requires that the value of capital held in a PI Trust (as defined by the Income Support Regulations) must be fully disregarded in a financial assessment. Unlike paragraph 16, paragraph 15 contains no exception for sums earmarked for care. Judge Auerbach described the statutory language as “clear, unambiguous and unqualified.” 

The court further held that the 2012 undertakings were personal, did not bind future deputies, and could not lawfully form part of the authority’s decision. The “double recovery” argument was rejected. Preventing double recovery is a matter for courts assessing damages, not for councils performing Care Act duties. The authority had also acted unlawfully by failing to conduct a lawful financial assessment and by seeking retrospective repayment.

The claim for judicial review succeeded. The decision confirms that personal injury trusts must be wholly disregarded in Care Act financial assessments, even where the damages relate to care costs. Local authorities cannot invoke double recovery to avoid statutory obligations.

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PROCEDURE

Kevin Demirci Properties Ltd v Huw Griffiths Architects Ltd [2026] EWHC 353 (TCC) – High Court

Claimant knowingly included a false allegation in its Particulars of Claim

This case concerns the a false allegation contained with the Claimant’s Particulars of Claim (“PoC”). The allegation was that the Claimant had entered into a joint venture agreement (“JVA”) with Sir Robert McAlpine in 2017 to fund and develop student accommodation in Swansea. It inflated the Claimant’s alleged losses from approx. £6.5 million (as stated in pre action correspondence) to over £13.5 million. The statement of truth was signed by the Claimant’s barrister (“Barrister M”) even though the Claimant knew that no such JVA existed.

The Defendant applied to the court to strike out the claim and obtain permission to bring contempt proceedings against the Claimant’s sole director, Mr Garip Demirci.

The evidence revealed that early drafts of the PoC made no reference to a JVA, the allegation only appeared in later drafts introduced by Barrister M. The judge found that the false allegation in the PoC resulted primarily from three failures by Barrister M:

• He did not properly read or understand his instructions, including that the loss figures in the spreadsheet were based on hypothetical profits from an unaccepted 2016/17 SRM joint venture proposal.
• He failed to investigate the factual basis for those loss estimates, accepting them without checking them against Mr Demirci’s draft witness statement or contemporaneous documents.
• He did not obtain the Claimant’s confirmation of the facts before signing the statement of truth.

Although Mr Demirci should have checked the drafts of the PoC more carefully, he was a layperson dealing with unclear communication, linguistic difficulties, and a chaotic drafting process.

The strike-out was refused. Applying Summers v Fairclough Homes, strike out is a “draconian” remedy reserved for exceptional cases. The false statement, although serious, was not deliberate or reckless, could be remedied, and did not prevent a fair trial.

Permission for contempt proceedings was also refused. There was no strong prima facie case that Mr Demirci knowingly made a false statement. The evidence showed confusion, not dishonesty, and the public interest did not require contempt proceedings.

The judge directed that the judgment be sent to regulators because of concerns about Barrister M’s conduct, including poor drafting, inadequate fact checking, and improperly signing a statement of truth.

The case highlights the critical importance of accurate pleadings, careful fact checking, and proper communication between lawyer and client. It serves as a warning that a legal representative must never sign a statement of truth without the client’s informed approval.

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Other News

• Removal of the 3-year limitation period for civil claims regarding child sexual abuse  

The Home Office has amended clause 87 of the Crime and Policing Bill to remove the three-year limitation period for civil personal injury claims arising from child sexual abuse.

The clause inserts a new section 11ZB into the Limitation Act 1980, providing that such claims must be dismissed if the Defendant satisfies the court that a fair hearing cannot take place.

More information can be found here.

• The Civil Justice Council launches consultation on AI use in court document preparation

CJC has launched a consultation on the use of AI by legal representatives in the preparation of court documents.

The consultation considers whether rules are required to regulate the use of AI in drafting pleadings, witness statements and expert reports. The consultation closes on 14 April 2026. Following the consultation, the CJC will publish a final report.

More information can be found here.

• Mazur update

The Appeal was heard during sessions on 23rd, 25th and 26th February 2026. We now await Judgment.